On August 10,1993 Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Contained in this legislation was a provision that revised the priority of claims on failed depository institutions by making other senior claimants junior to depositors.
Congress apparently hoped to reduce Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) losses by thus changing the capital structure of banks to enhance the priority of depositors and thus of the FDIC.
Unlike subordinated debenture holders, however, general creditors of depository institutions can restructure their claims to effectively make them senior to depositors. For example, in response to the implementation of depositor preference laws (DPLs) a general creditor might collateralize her claim. Alternatively, she could shorten the maturity of her claim to increase the probability she could exit before the bank is closed. While there have been theoretical analyses of how DPL should affect the values of various bank claimants, there have been no empirical analyses of whether or not the FDIC's losses have been reduced, or whether general creditors have responded so as to offset the intended benefits to the FDIC.'
Although little time has passed since the passage of the 1993 legislation some individual states already had DPL in effect. In this paper, we examine the impact on FDIC resolution costs of such state legislation from [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] , extending the empirical analyses of closed-bank resolution cost models by James (1991) , Osterberg and Thomson (1995) (henceforth, OT), and Osterberg (1996) . The theoretical framework follows Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990) and Osterberg and Thomson (1994) , where DPL reduces the value of the FDIC claim unless general creditors undertake some offsetting a~t i o n .~ We also test the hypothesis advanced by some analysts that DPL might influence the FDIC's choice of resolution type, control for the endogeneity of book measures of bank capital, and correct for sample selection bias introduced by regulatory closure rules.
See Thomson (1994) for an example of how FDIC losses may increase as a result of depositor preference laws.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section I outlines the depositor preference legislation and the FDIC's implementation of it. Section 11 reviews the existing literature. The data and the empirical method are presented in III. Our (1) Administrative expenses of the receiver.
(2) Deposit liabilities.
(3) General or senior liabilities.
(4) Subordinated obligations.
(5) Shareholder claims.
Prior to DPL, general or other senior liabilities had the same priority of payment as deposits. However, regardless of the presence of depositor preference, secured creditors of the failed depository will have their claims satisfied first, up to the amount of the collateral. This implies that general or senior creditors could protect their claim by responding to the passage of DPL by increasing collateral.
Clearly, the value of deposit liabilities and claims lower in the pecking order depends on the interpretation of "administrative expenses of the receiver." On August 13,1993 the FDIC issued an interim rule which clarified its interpretation of these expenses, indicating that such expenses include "post appointment obligations incurred by the receiver as part of the liquidation of an institution." and that "this priority also covers certain expenses incurred prior to the appointment of the receiver." 4 In other words, the receiver (which for most banks and thrifts is the FDIC) may pay expenses it deems to be consistent with the orderly closure of the institution, even if those expenses were incurred prior to the depository's closure. These pre-receivership expenses include.
the payment of the institution's last payroll, guard services, data processing &ices, utilities aitd lease payments. Examples of expenses that would be excluded are items .
such as golden parachute claims, severance pay claims, and liabilities arising from the repudiation of contracts.
Related Literature
The purported impact of DPL is to decrease the FDIC's costs of resolving bank failures. Such costs derive from three sources. First are the losses that reflect the underlying insolvency of the bank. These are the realization of the downside risk associated with a bank's investment and financing decisions. On an economist's extended balance sheet, these losses equal the negative market net worth of the firm (excluding the value of government guarantees). Second are the losses related to forbearance, which are incurred after the depository is no longer economically viable but before it is closed. Federal Register (1993) . At the time of this writing the FDIC had not issued a final rule on depositor preference. Although the costs of forbearance have not been explicitly calculated for banks, DeGennaro and Thornson (1996) find that these costs were considerable for thrifts. 6 Kane (1986) argues that information, funding, administrative and legal, and political constraints cause bank regulators to adopt suboptimal closure rules. Allen and Saunders (1993) (1990) claim that the new legislation increases the incentive to collateralize.
They further conclude that the damage done by DPL to the insurer and the uninsured depositor increases with the degree of collateralization of nondeposit claims and the extent of insolvency.
It has also been claimed that depositor preference would harm smaller community banks and thrifts. Banks with lower levels of capital supposedly would have a harder time floating debt, borrowing federal funds, leasing computers, and renting space. Some banks might be shut out of the derivatives markets or see their credit rating on bankers' acceptance or bank notes downgraded? Large banks and, in particular, those seen as too-big-to-let fail supposedly would have an enhanced advantage in attracting deposits over $100,000 since such deposits may not be seen as being at risk, though the risk would increase for smaller banks with depositor preference. Claims have also been made of a negative impact on market discipline though others claim a positive impact due to the increased risk of loss among n~n d e~o s i t o r s .~ There has been little empirical research on the impact of depositor preference legislation (DPL), despite repeated claims of benefits. Hirschhorn and &NOS (1990) found that, following the passage of state DPL, general creditors of affected savings and loans increased collateralization and interest rates on uninsured certificates of deposits Liability for unresolved legal cases was $404 million. Costs of receivership also include losses that arise from the inefficient asset salvage operation of the receiver (see Kane [1990] ).
See Rehm (1993) 9 See Kaufman (1997).
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fell. While Osterberg (1996) finds evidence that resolution costs for commercial banks closed in states with DPL were lower than in other states, the exact role played by DPL is unclear. In studies which provide no role for DPL, Bovenzi and Murton (1988) , James (1991), and OT model resolution costs as determined by problem assets,-risky assets, and core deposits. OT also include proxies for fraud and off-balance sheet risk. Below we will attempt to tike into account empirical findings on the determinants of -resolution costs and to discern the mechanism through which DPL might play an additional role. We address three econometric problems with previous studies of closed-bank resolution costs. The first is that these studies usually fail to control for the endogeneity of book capital [see (Maddala (1986) and Thomson (1992) l. The second is that estimates of a single equation model of closed-bank resolution costs suffer from sample selection bias induced by regulatory closure rules [see Barth et al. (1990) l. Finally, these studies fail to control for the endogeneity of the choice of resolution type. In the estimation of our empirical model we will econometrically correct for these effects.
Our empirical model focuses on two equations that are estimated sequentially.
In equation (1) The key to understanding how and why DPL might influence the FDIC's choice of resolution type is an outline of the way in which DPL would affect the outcomes to 10 The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 gave the FDIC an intermediate option for handling a failed bank, the bridge bank. Under bridge bank authority (which was expanded by FIRREA 1989) the FDIC can pass the assets and liabilities of the failing bank into a specially chartered National bank which the FDIC can operate for up to three years. The bridge bank option gives the FDIC more flexibility in resolving closed banks by extending the time it has to weigh its alternative resolution options. 7 various creditor claims under different types of resolutions. As was noted by Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990) , under liquidation and without depositor preference, the FDIC will share with both the uninsured depositors and nondepositors. In a n assisted merger, on the other hand, all deposits are covered even without depositor preference and the nondeposit claims are passed on to the acquiring institution. However, with depositor preference the nondeposit claims may not be passed on.
From this analysis, Hirschhorn and Zervos conclude that the only case where depositor preference will unambiguously benefit the FDIC is in an assisted merger (e-g. For the estimation of the resolution type equation, we group the OBA banks and the P&A banks into a single category and estimate equation (1) using probit.
12
Variable definitions are given in Table 2 and the top panel of Table 6 lists the variables included in the resolution type equation. These variables were chosen by stepwise regression with the order shown in the top panel of Table 3 being the order in which the variables were chosen. l 3
The coefficient on our dummy variable for depositor preference status will be negative (positive) if state banks in states with DPL are more likely to be resolved via liquidation (P&A or OBA). The discussion above also implies that higher levels of COREDEP (and thus lower levels of nondeposit claims) would encourage the use of P&As and OBA. Keeley (1990) claims that COREDEP controls for the franchise (charter) value and is a source of unbooked gains. Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) argue that the FDIC will try to mimirnize its losses by closing banks in a manner that preserves the value of the charter. We include as an explanatory variable the predicted value of net worth/total assets generated as described below.
Equation12) is the resolution cost equation. Since little case-specific data on receivership costs is available, let alone the marginal receivership cost for each closed institution, we measure the dependent variable as the total resolution cost. The list of independent variables extends that in OT. We estimate (2) by weighted-least squares and, as is the case for all the equations, regressors are dated 4 to 6 months before the closure date.
RESCOST is the FDIC's estimated resolution cost as published by the FDIC (1993, Appendix A). OREO, PD30, and PDNA are proxy variables for asset quality. Given that the primary sources of unbooked losses are losses on the asset portfolio, on-book problem assets should be a good proxy for these unbooked losses. As discussed above, COREDEP controls for the franchise value and is a source of unbooked gains. UNCOL is a proxy for problem assets not reported by the bank. As Bovenzi and Murton (1988) note, distressed banks have incentives to cover up the amount of problem assets in their portfolio. One method for doing this is to book income on a nonperforming loan to prevent it from being classified as past due or nonaccrual. This implies that UNCOL would be positively correlated with unbooked losses. Book equity plus reserves, CAPPRED, represent the cushion between the value of assets and the promised payments to debt holders. NCRASST is included as a proxy for portfolio risk.
OT included dummy variables for filer types (filer type is related to size) and size categories defined by the dummies DSZ1-DSZ6. We replace these categories by LNASST, a decision supported by a standard specification test, and add variables capturing regional variation in banking condition^.'^ Predicted resolution type is also included: if the FDIC minimizes resolution cost (subject to various legal and regulatory constraints) through its choice of resolution type, DPL'S impact on resolution cost may be partly absorbed through the inclusion of predicted resolution type in the resolution cost equation. We also include a predicted level of net worth. Predicted values for both resolution type and the level of net worth are included to control for their endogeneity. The standard errors are adjusted as described below.
Although (1) and (2) Tables 3,4 , and 5 present the results for the net worth equations and the closure equation, respectively. The interested reader is referred to Thornson (1992) for an interpretation of the coefficients of these equations. Table 6 contains the estimated coefficients for equation (1) DSBRNCH, the dummy variable for branching regulations, is negative and significant. Given that the number of potential acquirers for a closed bank is higher in states without intrastate branching restrictions we would expect DSBRNCH be positively related to the use of the purchase and assumption resolution option (and other types of assisted mergers). Thomson (1992) finds that the probability a bank is closed is inversely related to its capitalization. This suggests that closed banks with high book capital ratios are , The results from equation (1) (1986), constraints faced by the FDIC may cause it to choose the resolution option that jointly minimizes its fiduciary, political, and other costs associated with resolving the closed bank. In a liquidation the FDIC would have to strictly observe depositor preference, whereas, in P&A and OBA it could choose to ignore it. Hence, DPL could increase the nonfiduciary costs to the FDIC associated with liquidations, increasing the relative attractiveness the its alternative failed-bank resolution options.
V. Results -
Estimated coefficients for equation (2) from the selection model appear in table 7 and 8.. Table 9 compares these results with those found in OT and Osterberg (1996) and thus indicates the importance of correcting for sample selection bias induced by regulatory closure rules. Estimated coefficients on the proxy variables for unbooked losses and gains in closed bank portfolios are larger (in absolute value) than those in previous studies, and in many cases the differences are statistically sigxuficant.
The coefficient on our instrument for book capital, CAPPRED, is negative and sigruficantly different from both zero and (-1). This corroborates the findings of James (1991) and OT of sigruficant unbooked losses on the balance sheets of failed banks. On the other hand, unlike James (1991) and OT, income earned but not received, UNCOL,
was not signhcant at the 10 percent level although the sign of its impact was positive.
However, the coefficient on UNCOL is positive and sigruficant in when equation (2) omits measures of fed funds sold, fed funds purchased and other borrowed money as regressors.
PDNA and ORE0 are included in equation (2) as proxies for asset quality. Both of these control for unbooked losses and have positive and significant coefficients. As in OT we find loans to insiders and portfolio risk to be positively and significantly related to resolution costs. Moreover, as in Osterberg (1996) we find that a positive and significant coefficient on FFSOLD. This is consistent with banks in depressed regional economies using fed funds as the residual asset item in managing the asset side of their balance sheet. Hence, FFSOLD may be proxying for the quality of the loan portfolio.
Off-balance sheet activities are negatively and significantly related to resolution costs. Similar results are found by OT when OBS is split into off-balance sheet loan items and other off-balance sheet activities. A negative and significant coefficient on OBS is consistent with the market discipline hypothesisof Boot and Thakor (1991) and the hypothesis that banks use derivative contracts to hedge against on-balance-sheet risk."
In Table 8 expected to increase costs. However, the negative and significant coefficient on FFPURCH and the negative coefficient on OBM are not consistent with general creditors increasing their collateralization. FFPURCH includes repurchase agreements whicli are collateralized so that we might have expected the average collateralization of this category to rise. One alternative explanation is similar to that suggested by the coefficient on OBS, namely that F~PURCH and OBM provide market discipline and that banks able to utilize these funding channels have lower unbooked losses than we have captured with our call report proxies for balance sheet quality.
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications
An examination of the period preceding the passage of the national depositor preference law provides no evidence to support claims that depositor preference will result in lower FDIC resolution costs. On the contrary, we find a positive relationship between depositor preference and the cost of resolving a closed bank. We also find a positive relationship between the presence of depositor preference laws and the use of P&A and OBA transactions, both of which minimize the benefit to the FDIC from depositor preference. These results are largely consistent with Kane's (1986) analysis of FDIC behavior.
The sample period we study precedes the implementation of FDICIA ( Observations are weighted by one divided by the square root of total assets. The first column is from the Table 3 , Osterberg and Thomson (1995) . The second column is unreported, referenced in from Osterberg (1996). * : significant at the 10% level. **: significant at the 5% level.
Results in third column use predicted capital and resolution type.
